How Al Qaeda-linked group’s fresh surge in Syria will embolden global jihad

Analysis

By Dr. Abhinav Pandya

No sooner than Israel and Hezbollah agreed to a highly fragile ceasefire, large-scale violence erupted in Syria with the onslaught of the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and the Free Syrian Army, the main rebel group backed by Turkey and the United States. The Middle East continues to boil and flare up. The ongoing attack comes as the largest offensive on Aleppo since 2016, when the rebel forces faced a rout in the northeastern neighbourhoods after a gruelling military operation by the Syrian army with the support of Russia, Iran, and its affiliated proxies.

In the last few days, the rebel forces and HTS have made major advances, cutting off the highway between Aleppo and Damascus. Further, they have captured significantly large parts of Idlib and Aleppo, including strategically sensitive settlements like Urm al-Sughra, Anjara, Kafr Basma, Urum al-Kubra, and Al-Houta. Additionally, rebel factions have captured the 46th Infantry base, the largest military base of the Syrian Army, several tanks, and a stockpile of missiles. Unexpectedly, the Syrian army collapsed within hours, and rebels with the overwhelming presence of Al Qaeda-linked Islamists swept through Aleppo, pushing towards the South. In the clashes, the death toll has risen to more than 200, and hundreds of civilians have fled the cities.

What’s behind the surge?

The frequent eruptions of conflicts in West Asia amidst a changing world order hardly surprise anyone. Yet, the fundamental question arises: What are the reasons for the new momentum in the conflict, which entered a stalemate after the Russia, Iran, and Turkey-brokered 2020 ceasefire agreement between the rebel forces and the Assad regime?

A closer scrutiny of the various factors driving the recent spurt reveals a multi-layered nature of the conflict, where the vested interests of overarching global geopolitical actors, regional players, and Islamist groups converge. Additionally, the worsening humanitarian crises and economic situation play a crucial role in rejuvenating the violence in Syria.

Among the local factors, the weakening of Hezbollah after its crushing defeat at the hands of the IDF and Iran’s entanglement with Israel’s war against the former’s proxies, i.e., Hamas and Hezbollah, have significantly downsized Asaad’s capabilities, morale, and grit. Iran and its militias, like Hezbollah, along with Russia, constituted the main force behind Assad’s robust military offensive and victory over the rebels. Russia’s engagement with the Ukraine war further weakened Assad’s position.

The beginning of the offensive immediately after the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire will open another military front for Iran, further deepening and widening its entanglements. The possibility of Israel conceiving a long-term, foolproof, and multi-pronged strategy to tire, frustrate, and dislodge Iran’s mullah regime cannot be ruled out. The recent upsurge of violence in Syria needs to be situated and understood in the larger framework of Israel’s Iran strategy.

Additionally, the resurgence of violence in Syria can further rupture the Iran-Turkey and Turkey-Russia ties. Turkey’s strategic positioning in the West Asian conflict theatre is very ambivalent. It claims to support Palestine against Israel; however, such lofty claims and high-pitch rhetoric fall apart in the face of realpolitik.

In Syria, Turkey has supported rebel groups and Islamist entities like HTS. Again, in Syria, Turkey claims to support the rebels but categorically states its frustration with the shock offensive of the rebel groups and the recent upsurge in violence.

Earlier, Turkey stationed its forces in Idlib province because the conflict situation worsened its refugee problem as most of the civilians started fleeing to Turkey. In the recent upsurge also, if the conflict intensifies, it will put more pressure on Turkey with the massive refugee inflow and worsening humanitarian crisis. Such a situation does not augur well for Turkey’s relationship with Iran and Russia.

Lastly, the worsening humanitarian crisis and economic woes have generated an acute sense of resentment and frustration among ordinary civilians, leaving them extremely frustrated and vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment. As a result, extremist groups like HTS get a ready supply of recruits, strengthening their morale to launch a military offensive. On the other side, Assad’s supporter Putin cannot send its infantry. At most, Moscow can help Assad with the aerial bombing.

Assad’s Syria versus Islamist Syria

Though superficially, it appears that the US and Israel are likely to make some tactical gains on some counts from the revived momentum in the Syrian conflict, the West stands to lose in the longer run. Agreed that Assad is a brutal dictator who envisaged a dangerous nuclear programme and did not even shy away from using chemical weapons on his people; however, the choice is between a Syria led by Assad or one ruled by Al Qaeda-linked Islamists like HTS.

Having swept through one of the robust government strongholds like Aleppo, Al Qaeda’s front group, HTS, feels emboldened. The strengthening of Sunni extremist groups like HTS is likely to embolden an array of Islamist elements, like how the Taliban’s victory became a role model for all kinds of Islamist entities. The entrenchment of HTS in Syria, following the possible ouster of Assad, will have far-reaching effects. It will provide a strong fillip to Islamic extremists in Europe and South Asia.

Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint. The article was first published in Firstpost.