Pakistan's Terror Machinery Back in Action: India needs a Security Overhaul

Analysis

By Dr. Abhinav Pandya 

The recent terrorist attacks in Jammu & Kashmir’s Pir Panjal valley has questioned official claims of terrorism heading towards a rapid decline in the Union Territory, particularly after the abrogation of Article 370.

Even before the abrogation, the authorities made claims that their counter-terrorism efforts had confined the terrorism to three districts of South Kashmir and that the Pir Panjal area, i.e., the Jammu region, had been rid of militancy a long time ago. Hence, post-Article 370 abrogation, the real test was in the Kashmir valley. No one thought of the Pir Panjal area.

So, today, almost five years after August 5, 2019, in Kashmir, the spike in the brutal terror attacks in Pir Panjal, an area declared terrorism-free long ago, is more than shocking. Sounding an alarming note, the recent developments suggest the following:

First, contrary to official and media versions, the state’s success in crushing the Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is not good enough.

Second, in the Kashmir valley, though the big-ticket terror attacks and fidayeen missions are not visible, Islamist outfits like Jamaat-e-Islami are massively working on the ground on radicalisation, restructuring, and strengthening their terror and Islamist networks.

Third, the fact that the hard-core Pakistani terrorists infiltrate and strike in Pir Panjal (Jammu region) shows they have robust intelligence penetration and networks and a support base among the local population.

Trends in Kashmir valley

One needs to look at the sentiment in the Valley and the other developments to understand the trajectory of future trends.

The phase after August 5, 2019, has seen a massive boost in tourism in Kashmir. Every year, the tourist footfall breaks its previous records. The local economy and trade have boomed, resulting in a large inflow of capital and growth in the economic prosperity of Kashmir. Present-day Kashmir may have strong separatist and fundamentalist ideological fervour coupled with unprecedented economic prosperity on account of booming tourism and development projects. The combination of money and anti-India sentiments is a lethal combination.

The separatist and extremist organisation, Jamaat-i-Islami, was officially banned in 2019, following which the NIA conducted several raids on their offices and the premises of its members and arrested several members of its first-rung leadership. However, all these actions have not made much dent in Jamaat’s popularity, penetration, hold, and activities on the ground.

After the ban, Jamaat changed tactics. Its secondary leadership is dispersed in rural areas. These leaders have stopped overtly displaying Islamic attire and mannerisms. Instead, they moved around as modern civilians, clean-shaven and wearing normal clothes. They are working among the students and youngsters, spreading their core message of Islamic Kashmir and carrying out their radicalisation agenda.

Recently, at the Central University of Kashmir, a professor with a PhD, Rubani Bashir, was arrested on charges of recruiting youth as terrorists. The police recovered arms and ammunition from him. In my telephonic conversation with informed interlocutors in Srinagar, some of whom include his students, I learned that this is just the tip of the iceberg.

Several Bashirs and their allies are working across the length and breadth of Kashmir. Reportedly, one of his associates with a similar mindset teaches at a Pune-based university. The election of Engineer Rashid, a separatist accused of terror funding, from the Baramulla Lok Sabha seat speaks volumes about popular sentiment. Likewise, Waheed Parra, the youth leader of the PDP, facing terror funding charges, also got a massive vote support of 200,000.

It also needs to be highlighted that the ordinary youth in Kashmir today look at the Kashmir situation through the pan-India Hindu-Muslim prism. Kashmiri youth’s alignment with the Indian hinterland’s Islamist groups and goals is stronger now. Rapidly spreading PFI’s Islamist narratives of making India an Islamic state by 2047 have started penetrating the crevices of Kashmiri minds as well.

In the Jammu region, several expert voices suggest that the Gujjar-Bakarwal community, which has traditionally supported Indian security forces, is going through alienation and resentment against the state authorities. They are agitated over the government’s decision to include Pahari ethnic groups, Gadda-Brahmin, Koli, and Paddari tribes in the Schedules Tribes category by the Constitution (Jammu and Kashmir) Scheduled Tribes Order (Amendment) Bill, 2023.

Reportedly, the alienation has led some of the disgruntled elements to provide support systems to the infiltrating terrorists. Gujjar-Bakarwals (GBs) are mostly nomadic. In winters, they are present in the 16 Corps, ie, the Jammu region, and in summers, they migrate with their animals to the 15 Xorps, ie, the Kashmir valley.

Such massive movements are quite unregulated and not tracked periodically. Though it is not confirmed, many veteran field commanders of the army have raised suspicions that these nomadic groups of GBs in some way facilitate the movement, shelter, communications, and intelligence work of local terrorists and foreign infiltrators.

In April 2024, as per my sources, some youth from the nomadic GBs reportedly chopped off a person because he clicked a picture of them smuggling bovine for slaughter. Such incidents demonstrate the increasing levels of radicalisation among the GBs, hitherto believed to be illiterate and highly moderate, and strongly indicate their elusive connections with the world of terrorism, particularly in the Jammu region.

Pakistan-based handlers have completely changed their strategy and tactics. They have dismissed the old OGWs, handlers, recruiters, and coordinators about whom the police had some clue, connection, or information. In the present situation, some key handlers sitting across the border are controlling the entire terror system through recruitment, movement, infiltration, execution of terror acts, and the movement of money and weapons.

They are using young boys and girls as couriers, entirely inconspicuous by their appearance and presence, leaving no window for any doubt or questioning by the police. Also, no formal and organised terror groups like Lashkar, Jaish, and Hizbul Mujahideen are at the forefront. There are no formal recruitments, with cadres announcing their joining on social media and large-scale funeral processions facilitating recruitments.

Additionally, the terrorists have gone radio silent. They are using new kinds of communication devices, such as ultrasets, which are immune to interception and de-encryption. It is a non-satellite phone working on ultra-high frequencies. Its circular probability error is 3.5 km, implying that its signals can be detected within this range. The pinpointed location cannot be detected. As per my interlocutor’s version, there is hardly any case in which the detection of ultrasets in any area has led to a successful encounter-contact with the terrorists.

Further, their encryption technology is highly sophisticated. Our security apparatus has not yet cracked it. The terrorists also use a blue-tooth-based application, viz, Bridge-ifi. It has a range of 300 metres, and generally, they use this app for local communication to relay messages. Besides, the OGWs also install modems in the mobile towers in a concealed manner. They receive the signals from across the border, which are relayed to terrorists.

When it comes to advanced drones, it needs to be highlighted that terrorists are using drones with precision drop systems. They drop within 10 metres of the target location. Our agencies have found it challenging to jam these drones, as they are pre-programmed and fly in autonomous mode. They are so designed that even when they are recovered, they hardly leave any material useful for digital forensics. It is extremely difficult to find incriminating evidence, such as the flying profile, details about its starting point, previous sorties, and test flights.

The other advanced features include higher elevation profiles, such as the ability to fly at an elevation of 1,500-2,000 metres with no sound or visual signature, rendering it almost impossible to hunt them down. Besides, our drone jamming and spoofing systems have not succeeded in most cases. Their backup endurance is very high. Generally, drones have a flight time of 50 minutes and a payload of five to six kilogrammes. However, contrary to this belief, in one case in Jammu, a drone was recovered, whose propellers were functioning for four hours after the recovery.

Hence, it can be reasonably concluded that the terror attacks are well-calibrated and strategic. They are not conducting big-ticket strikes to avoid crossing India’s tolerance threshold. However, they are active on the ground, building their robust base, intelligence penetration, and support structures. Such an infrastructure will come in handy when General Headquarters Rawalpindi wants massive and violent unrest combined with large-scale terrorist violence in Kashmir.

These new above-mentioned tactics have done major damage to the intelligence networks, assets, and systems created by the security forces in Kashmir over the last 20 years. In effect, the intelligence grid is in disarray, particularly in the Pir-Panjal region, enabling the adversary to infiltrate terrorists from Samba-Hiranagar to Poonch-Rajouri and strike at the time and place of their choice.

Policing needs major reforms

Amidst the rapidly changing tactics and strategies of terrorists, the human intelligence element in our counter-terrorism intelligence apparatus has taken the worst hit. Previously, between 2016 and 2019, the over-reliance on technological intelligence, resulting in successful encounters, eroded the human intelligence capabilities and traditional intelligence network crafted by the security forces in J&K over decades.

However, the worst has arrived after the declaration of J&K as UT. Mostly, young direct IPS recruits from the UT cadre have been posted as district police chiefs and in other critical counter-terrorism positions. These officers have about three-to-four years of experience in policing, and that too outside Kashmir; hence, they do not understand the complex dynamics of terrorism, radicalisation, society, and intelligence in Kashmir.

They lack ground connection, knowledge, and rootedness in the local cultural, social, political, and religious structures. In several cases, I was told that many of them make the locals wait for hours outside their office before meeting them. Such an attitude smacks of arrogance and is unsuitable for working in a conflict zone. Mostly, the local people from villages provide crucial intelligence inputs; hence, the police chiefs in the district must have a robust network among the locals. Typical bureaucratic behaviour and arrogance prevalent in other states may be extremely detrimental to J&K and hamper the flow of critical intelligence.

Previously, veteran counter-terrorism expert officers from the Jammu and Kashmir Police commanded the districts. They were the locals with a robust knowledge of regional dynamics and terrorism. They were from the state police services and hence brought the vast experience of having served in the field in the 2000s and 2010s. In those days, when security forces lacked robust technological intelligence capabilities, these officers mostly relied on human intelligence. As a part of that, they created excellent networks of assets that infiltrated and exfiltrated the terror groups.

The crucial human intelligence from someone infiltrated within the terrorist organisation was actionable and mostly led to successful encounters, with only a few exceptions, wiping out the entire leadership of dreaded groups like Jaish and Lashkar. These JKP officers were the only local connectors who facilitated the work of about 60 COs of the RR units of the Indian Army, mostly outsiders, CAPFs, and other agencies. Now, most of them have been sidelined. As a result, they are demoralised and have lost contact with their former assets and sources. The result of such a colossal fall in our human intelligence apparatus can be seen in the form of large-scale terror attacks and security forces operating almost cluelessly, particularly in the Jammu region.

Another negative effect of sidelining the old stalwarts is that the new appointees, due to their lack of experience and sufficient exposure to Kashmir dynamics, are not able to understand the mindset and the clandestine activities and networks of some of their lower-level subordinates in the police and state intelligence.

Also, a crucial factor that is currently damaging our counter-terrorism capabilities is the lack of coordination between the various security and intelligence agencies. In J&K, the key to success in counter-terrorism is robust coordination and cooperation between the JKP, Indian Army, CAPFs, and an array of intelligence agencies working in the state. The last 30 years of counter-terrorism efforts have resulted in an excellent coordination mechanism and unwritten SOPs for conducting joint operations between various security agencies. Hence, it must be ensured that ad-hoc experiments are not initiated to destroy decades of hard work.

Finally, it needs to be realised that in J&K, the top priorities of policing are counter-terrorism and law and order. Hence, a highly bureaucratic style of functioning in matters of operational and intelligence requirements of funds, etc, is not a sane idea. Also, an overly centralised approach to controlling and managing the assets and informers of junior and mid-ranking officers can be detrimental, leading to delays and the exposure of sources. Also, the senior leadership needs to give enough space to its junior and district-level officers to recruit and run sources and double agents per their requirements. Notably, only such double agents placed deep within the terror group or Pakistan’s intelligence circuit can provide actionable input. Sometimes, they cross you and provide low-grade intelligence. In several incidents, for example, they offered input about some unimportant terrorists infiltrating the Line of Control (LoC) and International Border (IB) and secured a safe passage for more hardened and trained terrorist commanders. These are the intelligence game’s challenges, hazards, and undesired risks.

To conclude, New Delhi must not be complacent with the current phase of peace. Pakistan has made massive investments in terrorism and radicalisation for three decades. To change things on the ground, a long-term plan based on an insightful strategic vision is needed. Hence, first and foremost, the Government of India must come out with a 25-year roadmap and vision document to dismantle the Islamist and separatist structures in Kashmir. They must rope in experts from diverse areas such as intelligence, SFs, police, sociology, psychology, religious organisations, civil society, and the media. Additionally, Delhi should distance itself from appeasement policies to buy loyalties. Tourism, development, and economic growth should be offered as incentives and returns for nationalism, secularism, and rationalism.

We need to realise that the final solution to Kashmir’s terrorism problem lies beyond the LoC and IB. We must make such terroir activities extremely costly for Islamabad through high-scale sub-conventional and conventional kinetic measures.

Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint. The article was first published in Firstpost.