Why US needs to accept multipolar world order with dignity

Expanding his argument, he says that although India was the third largest spender on defence in 2021, according to the SIPRI database, its total expenditure is only one-fourth of China’s. Japan has the third largest economy, but its GDP is less than one-fourth of China’s. Germany, India, France, and the UK’s shares are even smaller than those of Japan. Arguing about the challenges emanating from blocks like EU and BRICS RIC, he says that these blocks are not coherent. They are a divided lot and suffer from internal rivalries.

Refuting the rigid criteria centred on economic and military indicators, Emma Ashford and Evan Cooper of the Stimson Centre disagree with Bekkevold and argue that the world is multipolar. In their paper published by the Stimson Centre, they conclude , “The United States simply does not hold the level of military and economic power it did during the early decades of the Cold War. Nor does today’s China match the Soviet Union at its peak.”

Hugh De Santis, a former US diplomat and the author of The Right to Rule: American Exceptionalism and The Coming Multipolar World Order, discusses at length in his National Interest article how the ongoing geopolitical transformation is leading us towards a multipolar world where power is no longer confined to one or two powerful states but is more diffused among several powerful nations, followed by the middle power jockeying for the same position. With 750 military bases spread over 80 countries and a vast network of alliances, treaties, strategic partnerships, and technologically advanced armed forces, the US ‘military footprint’ has no parallel.

However, even with such a robust fighting force, Washington failed to prevent the Russians from invading Ukraine, achieve a decisive victory over the Taliban, and check China in the Taiwan Strait, bringing rogue states like Iran and North Korea to fall in line. The Ukraine war has severely dented US credibility. There are serious doubts among the NATO members about the US’ sincerity and commitment to protecting their sovereignty.

China emerged as the biggest gainer as the war made Russia and China close strategic partners, further weakening the US position. Russia’s recent gains on the Ukrainian front seem to have convinced the US experts in the Republican camp that pushing Russia further into the Chinese camp will be a diplomatic disaster. If Trump wins, a breakthrough on the Ukrainian front can be expected. But it’s too late, as by then it would have secured its gains, and the dent made in the Western camp will be irreparable.

Its main adversary, China, is modernising its army at an alarming pace, expanding its nuclear arsenal, developing ICBMs, SLBM (long-range sea-launched ballistic missiles), 350 new missile silos, and DF-17 medium-range missiles with hypersonic glide vehicles. China has the world’s largest navy, equipped with nuclear submarines and SLBMs that can target several states in the US. Beijing is also building military bases in Africa, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and the South Pacific.

America’s traditional adversary Russia , with its expected growth rate of 2.6 per cent in 2024, is also developing its arsenal, modernising the Iskandar M short-range ballistic missile, the 9M729 cruise missile, and developing the Sarmat ICBM and nuclear-powered submersible drones releasable from submarines. Rogue states like Iran and North Korea are also cozying up with Russia and China, which likely will lead to them getting access to high-end missile and satellite technology. In the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union controlled 40 per cent of the global military and economic power; however, today, the share for China and the US has come down to 30 per cent.

In terms of the economy, Moscow and Washington, with their allies, owned 88 per cent of the global GDP in 1950; however, today, their share is only 57 per cent. The US share of the global GDP has halved from 50 per cent in 1950 to marginally higher than 25 per cent today at the market exchange rates. In PPP terms, it is only 15 per cent whereas Asia-Pacific countries’ share stands at 45 per cent of which China contributes 19 per cent. Likewise, American universities and corporations are also being challenged in the top 10 rankings by emerging economic heavyweights like China and India.

In the Times Higher Education Survey, American universities in the top 100 declined from 43 in 2018 to 34 in 2022. According to the Forbes Global List of Corporations, there were three American corporations in the top 10 in 2010 and five in the top 20. In the 2023 Forbes list , there were three Chinese corporations in the top 10. Today, India, having emerged as the fifth-largest economy at market prices and third-largest at PPP, accounts for 7.5 per cent of the global GDP.

China is also chipping away at America’s technological dominance. In 1960, US investment in R&D was 69 per cent of the global investment, which has shrunk to 25 per cent in 2020. On the other hand, China’s share has increased from 4.8 per cent in 2000 to 23 per cent in 2023. Also, today, China has the highest number of patents and the largest market for electric vehicles. The US attempts to counter Beijing by adopting protectionist policies that impose taxes and duties. Also, China is suffering from a slow growth rate because of a lack of domestic demand, declining exports, an ageing population, and a dictatorial government; however, despite that, China continues to be the largest trading partner of 120 countries, America’s third largest export market, and the largest purchaser of American bonds. Controlling 70 per cent of the extraction and 90 per cent of the processing of rare earth minerals, China has overwhelming control over its supply chain.

In diplomacy and geopolitics, the US is no longer the uncontested leader of the world. The unipolar moment is gone. China is primarily challenging it, followed by middle powers like India, Russia, Brazil, France, Turkey, and rogue regimes like Iran and North Korea. In the Middle East, Chinese inroads through a plethora of strategic connectivity projects and development partnerships have alarmed US strategic quarters. The recurrent theme in the IR discourse is the US withdrawal from the Middle East.

Heavily sanctioned countries like Iran have not been reined in yet. It has increased uranium enrichment by up to 60 per cent, close to the weapons grade. It has signed a 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement with China. With its array of proxy terrorist groups like Houthis and Hezbollah, Tehran has emerged as a major player in the Middle East. It is also supplying drones to Russia. Turkey’s Erdogan nurtures dreams to revive the glory of the Ottoman caliphate. Its dealings with the US and the West are highly transactional, not of servility and docility. Though Ankara has supported the inclusion of Sweden in NATO, it has refused to buckle under US pressure to support sanctions against Russia. India, an emerging Middle Power in the league of Turkey and Brazil, also refused to follow the American diktat on the Ukraine conflict and refused to condemn Russia. Despite the US pressure, India continued to buy the discounted Russian oil and maintain its robust trade relations with China. However, to balance China, its prime adversary, New Delhi has joined the US-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

Finally, one can always talk about the rise of new blocks like BRICS and SCO and alternate multilateral institutions like BRICS Investment Bank, China Infrastructure Investment Bank, and global China-led strategic connectivity projects like BRI challenging the US/West-led liberal/democratic world order. However, besides these rival and alternate institutions, the chinks in the armour of the US and its allies are also markedly visible. There are major apprehensions among the European states about the future of NATO and the US response to Russia and China if Trump comes to power. Germany has already allotted 100 billion euros for a military revamp. The possibility of EU members developing their own defence capabilities, including the acquisition of nuclear capabilities against perceived Russian revisionism, is strong and aligns well with multipolarity.

Multipolarity: Conceptions and Discomforts

In light of the facts and analysis presented above, it can be safely concluded that the US does not hold the same military might, economic size, and diplomatic clout it enjoyed during the Cold War and in the 1990s. Likewise, China is not even what the Soviet Union was at its peak. One can witness the rise of several middle powers, like Brazil, India, Turkey, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, etc.

The multipolarity of the world order has already begun. On closer analysis, it can be observed that even during the Cold War, there was nothing like rigid bipolarity in the world order. The non-aligned block, led by countries like India, Egypt, Yugoslavia, and Malaysia, exercised significant influence in global politics.

It can be argued that the fundamental flaw is rooted in our definitions of polarity. Experts like Bekkevold use extremely narrow criteria for economic and military indicators while analysing and defining a nation’s power. Such metrics can be misleading. However, the economic and military indicators constitute a major component of the comprehensive national power of any country, which is not all. States derive power from many other sources, such as their geography, internal government structure, civilizational narrative, and their leadership’s resolve and philosophical understanding of international relations. For example, the US, in its Global War on Terrorism, was hugely dependent on a poor and unstable country like Pakistan. Despite the concrete evidence provided by the Indians about Pakistan’s suspicious role in 9/11, the US state allegedly tried to downplay it. Following that, Pakistan’s tacit support for the Taliban, who were sending the US soldiers back home in body bags, was reportedly known to the Americans. Also, Pakistan’s use of American aid to nurture terrorist groups was no secret. However, the US continues to engage with and support Pakistan.

In the last 70 years of American history, its massive military adventures and use of brute force in places like Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan could hardly bring a decisive victory. Heavily sanctioned countries like North Korea and Iran continue to challenge American might. A country like India, with its moderate economic and military power, has successfully resisted US pressure during the Cold War and, most recently, during the Ukraine war. Countries like India, Russia, Turkey, and China capitalise on the civilizational narrative by projecting power and strengthening their global diplomatic clout. After the recent gains on the Ukraine front, the Putin-led Russian Federation appears confident, no matter what the global media reports.

Recently, at the second Congress of the International Russophile Movement and Multipolarity Forum, it was distinctly evident that Putin is working on the realisation of Prof Alexander Dugin’s Russian vision of its sphere of influence, civilizational state-centric multipolarity. Even India, a relatively quiet, non-aggressive, and rule-abiding state, has undergone a major change under Modi’s Hindu-nationalist government in its perception of itself. New Delhi now sees itself as a unique civilizational state. Mohan Bhagwat, chief of the Hindu nationalist RSS, the main force behind the Modi government, has openly stated that India will realise its dream of Akhand Bharat (Greater India) in the next 15 years, even though the RSS has never clearly defined its idea of Akhand Bharata and has emphasised the aspect of cultural unity instead of the territorial aspect.

Also, for multipolarity, there is no need for an equal power distribution among several countries. Two, three, or four powerful states and a range of middle powers can contest for eminence and influence. This situation can be defined as a state of unbalanced multipolarity. The current distribution of power in the world approximates unbalanced multipolarity.

Additionally, another major misconception about multipolarity is the highly constricted and power-centric approach towards the concept of polarity. Reducing the idea of multipolarity to a balanced or unbalanced distribution of power among various states is an oversimplification. The current trends towards multipolarity also emanate from the unmet expectations of the countries of the Global South from the West-led unipolar or bipolar world order. S Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister, calls it a ‘world order that is very, very deeply Western’. The countries of the Global South nurture many grievances against multilateral institutions like the UN and global financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF. Their discomfort with the universalization of Western values and the Western double standards in implementing its so-called liberal-democratic values and human rights has come to the point of frustration, where the Western leadership has lost credibility. Hence, the Global South seeks a redistribution of power. Given this, alternate institutions like China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS Development Bank naturally appear as lucrative substitutes.

Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint. The article was first published in Firstpost.