Mahadev, Malegaon, And India’s Final War Against Terror

Analysis

By Dr. Abhinav Pandya 

The last week of July 2025 has seen three significant developments in the world of counterterrorism. In Kashmir, the Indian army neutralised three Pakistani terrorists, including Suleiman Hashim Musa, the mastermind behind the Pahalgam attack. In a parallel development, a UNSC report explicitly stated that the TRF could not have executed the Pahalgam terror attack without support from LeT. The third and most sensitive development was the NIA court’s acquittal of Col Purohit, Sadhvi Pragya, and Kulkarni in the Malegaon blast case, following years of torture, harassment, and humiliation in a fabricated, politically motivated, and botched-up investigation.

In the past four decades, cross-border terrorism has been at the core of India’s security challenges. It began with Khalistan and Kashmir terrorism in the late 70s. At that time, India, complacent about its superiority over Pakistan in conventional warfare, confronted terrorism in Punjab, Kashmir, and the North East. Over these four decades, India has faced the worst and most brutal forms of terrorism, including abductions, hijackings, massacres, minority killings, murders, IED attacks, suicide bombings, and fidayeen attacks. The horrors of Chattisinghpora, Nandimarg, the Parliament attack, bomb blasts in Mumbai, Jaipur, Delhi, Bangalore, and Coimbatore, the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, the Pulwama Fidayeen attack, and the recent Pahalgam attack have bruised India’s morale, communal harmony, and stability multiple times. However, India never succumbed to terrorists. It always demonstrated a firm resolve in its fight against terror, even when the West, preoccupied with the spectre of communism, ignored the expansion of Jihadism globally.

Left without allies in 1990 after the Soviet Union’s disintegration and a collapsing economy, India faced deadly terrorist movements in Kashmir, Punjab, and the North-East. Pakistan, the primary supporter of cross-border terrorism in India, was favoured by the West. In the 1980s, GHQ Rawalpindi carried out covert operations for the CIA. ISI veterans like Col Imam and Gen Hamid Gul trained Deobandi jihadists from Afghanistan and Pakistan for a prolonged proxy war in Afghanistan. In return, Washington provided Pakistan with billions of dollars in aid and military support, which Pakistan diverted to finance terrorist activities in J&K.

Fueled by drug money and US backing, Pakistan pursued nuclear ambitions. By the early 1990s, Pakistan was fast closing the nuclear gap with India. India was in a difficult position. With the rise of the Taliban, India lost Afghanistan, another key neighbour and ally. Strategically, Afghanistan’s loss was a major setback to India’s national security. Under the overarching Pakistani umbrella, the jihadist takeover of Pakistan led to the emergence of numerous terrorist groups, terror training camps, drug smuggling networks, infiltration routes, crime syndicates, and illegal weapons markets. Consequently, an array of transnational Deobandi and Wahhabi terror groups like Harkat-ul-Mujahiddin, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HuGI), Lashkar-e-Toiba, Al Badr, and Hizbul Mujahiddin made Kashmir the epicentre of terrorist activities. After Pakistan’s successful nuclear tests in 1998, its audacity knew no bounds, unleashing more lethal groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad.

India’s cautious, measured, moderate, and proportionate military response, combined with diplomatic efforts aimed at peaceful resolution, demonstrated patience and strategic restraint. India’s restraint and patience stemmed from practical geopolitical considerations and moral and civilisational values, as reflected in the Ramayana and Mahabharata, where Lord Rama and Krishna sought peace until the very end, even at personal sacrifice. However, India faced the embarrassment of releasing Masood Azhar in exchange for freeing 150 passengers of IC-814.

After a series of ISI-orchestrated bomb blasts in Mumbai, Jaipur, Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Coimbatore, Hyderabad, and other cities, India was helpless. ISI’s covert capabilities emboldened indigenous jihadist groups like SIMI and IM, who developed close ties with them. Following the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, the then government chose not to retaliate, leaving the average Indian feeling humiliated and betrayed.

However, after Modi’s rise to power, India broke the shackles and began regaining lost ground on national security. Modi started with a bang. India’s surgical strike after the Uri fidayeen attack was the first signal of change, calling out Pakistan’s nuclear bluff. But Pakistan refused to accept the change. After Burhan Wani’s encounter-death in 2016, ISI masterminds orchestrated widespread violent civil unrest in the Kashmir Valley, followed by a long spell of homegrown insurgency. In some areas of South Kashmir, the state’s writ ceased to exist. However, India’s massive crackdown soon forced the rioters and stone-pelters to retreat. Following that, the Central government’s All-Out operation against terrorists signalled Delhi’s force posture with an unprecedented clarity.

Modi’s message was clear – guns, bombs, and bullets will be met with force, but those who wish to talk are welcome. NIA’s massive crackdown on terror funding and the separatist ecosystem dealt a deathblow to separatism and jihadism. For the first time, the Indian government responded with a holistic, bold, and courageous approach, not only against gun-toting terrorists but also against internal subversionists who weakened India’s foundations from within as journalists, academics, administrators, engineers, etc.

Once again, Pakistan responded with the deadly fidayeen attack in Pulwama, killing 40 Indian soldiers. For the first time, Indian fighter jets flew deep inside Pakistani territory and retaliated with air strikes on Balakot, neutralising 300 Jaish terrorists. The message was clear – India will not succumb to nuclear blackmail and will hit hard inside enemy territory.

Continuing its fight against terror, India abrogated Article 370 in 2019, a historic move that still amazes us – ordinary citizens had lost faith in the Indian state’s ability to carry out such a measure until Modi removed it. After the Kashmir move, New Delhi invested heavily in development and tourism in Kashmir. Although grievances and grudges about abrogating Article 370 persisted and intensified due to bureaucratic apathy, Kashmir began to change. The youth had new expectations. However, Pakistan refused to relent and changed its strategy. It created an array of proxy terror groups with secular-sounding names like TRF, PAFF, and Kashmir Tigers, so that India would not have a legitimate reason to blame Pakistan after future terror attacks, as its conventional groups like LeT and Jaish were overexposed. Meanwhile, the NIA continued its drive against terror financing, recruitment, and internal subversion.

As we move forward, it is clear that any future Pahalgam-like terror attack will likely lead to significant cartographic changes in South Asia. However, beyond Kashmir, India faces a major war against Jihadism in its hinterland. Due to polarised social and political discourse, bitter communal tensions, widespread jihadist activities, and Muslim radicalisation, every city sits on a ticking time bomb. Any spark could ignite major civil unrest and communal rioting. India’s intelligence and kinetic capabilities require a massive overhaul and upgrade. Sooner or later, we must confront the jihadist juggernaut, which is comprehensive and multifaceted. Additionally, the state must consider its covert links with Pakistan and Bangladesh-based jihadist entities and global jihadist organisations. Before the jihadist machinery makes a final effort to transform India into an Islamist nation by 2047, as the PFI document stated, the state must act systematically, long-term, and determinedly.

Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint. The article was first published in News18.