Wang Yi Visits India: A Paradigm Shift in Asian Geopolitics or a Tactical Signalling

Analysis

By Dr. Abhinav Pandya 

China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s August 18, 2025, visit to India has generated tremors in the global geo-strategic quarters. Wang Yi met India’s Foreign Minister Jaishankar, for the second time since the breakdown of bilateral ties in 2020 following the Galwan clash, and another immensely influential figure in India’s strategic setup, namely NSA Ajit Doval.

Wang Yi’s India visit is a shocker or a dampener after global think tanks, journalists, diplomats, strategic thought leaders, and academics praised India as one of the pillars of the Quad, producing a wealth of literature on India’s potential stakes, involvement, and role in countering and containing China, though India always showed its reluctance and recalcitrance, in publicly committing itself as a US lackey in Asia to counter China, like a child being lifted from its hunky-dory world and forced into the global conflict. Even the Quad also maintained a semblance of moderation in its anti-China posturing by projecting sophisticated geopolitics of climate change and the blue economy; however, the shrewd watchers of geopolitics have been keenly awaiting the military transformation of the Quad, as a kind of Asian NATO. However, the August 18 meeting of the Chinese foreign minister with influential Indian figures raises the following question impacting the fundamentals of the emerging global security architecture:

Is India-China rapprochement genuine, i.e., are the bilateral ties improving to the extent that India has left the Western camp and fixed its issues with China? Is this trust, bonhomie, and engagement concrete, meaningful, sustainable, stable, and substantial, or is it just a skin-deep tactical move by India to hedge its bets, given its worsening relations with the US?

In his meetings with the EAM, Wang Yi discussed granting access to Indian pilgrims to religious sites in the TAR, sharing river data. On the Indian side, New Delhi is likely to grant visas to Chinese nationals, resume direct flights to China, and trade through designated Himalayan passes. The Chinese foreign minister stated that both countries should view each other as partners, rather than adversaries or threats. Sharing his thoughts on the recent thaw in bilateral ties, he said that the relations are now on a “positive trend” towards cooperation and “we are moving ahead from a difficult period in our ties.”

Following the mutual agreement on patrolling arrangements to de-escalate tensions, Wang Yi’s meeting with NSA Ajit Doval in October 2024 is a crucial development regarding the vexed boundary issue. Signalling a positive trend, he said that “stability has now been restored at the borders.”  Chinese readout on Wang Yi’s meetings in Delhi said, “China-India relations are showing a positive trend toward returning to the main course of cooperation. This year marks the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India. Both sides should earnestly draw lessons from the past 75 years, form a correct strategic perception, view each other as partners and opportunities rather than rivals or threats, invest their valuable resources in development and revitalization, and explore right ways for neighboring major countries to get along with each other,  which are characterized by mutual respect and trust, peaceful coexistence, pursuit of common development, and win-win cooperation.” Further, the readout said, “Jaishankar said that under the joint guidance of leaders of both countries, India-China relations have moved from the bottom and are continuously improving and developing, with exchanges and cooperation between the two sides across various fields moving toward normalization…………It is crucial for India and China to improve their strategic perceptions of each other. As the two largest developing countries, both India and China uphold multilateralism and are committed to promoting a fair and balanced multi-polar world. The two countries should also jointly maintain the stability of the world economy.”

On the future trajectory of the bilateral relations, the readout said, “Stable, cooperative, and forward-looking India-China relations serve the interests of both countries. Taiwan is part of China. India is willing to take the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries as an opportunity to deepen political mutual trust with China, strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation in economy, trade and other fields, enhance people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and jointly maintain peace and tranquility in border areas. India fully supports China in hosting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Tianjin Summit and is willing to strengthen coordination and cooperation with China in BRICS and other multilateral mechanisms.

Most importantly, these meetings occurred before PM Modi’s planned visit to Beijing later this month to attend the SCO, where he is likely to hold a bilateral meeting with Xi Jinping.

Hence, barring the minor irritant caused by the Chinese readout mentioning India’s support for the One-China policy, the document reflects a positive spirit on both sides. Officially, India adheres to the One-China policy; however, it has refrained from mentioning it in the joint communiques since 2010. In response to the Chinese readout, India clarified its position that “there is no change in our position on Taiwan. We stressed that, like the rest of the world, India has a relationship with Taiwan that focuses on economic, technological, and cultural ties. We intend to continue it.”

The individual statements of the Indian and Chinese leaders, as well as the Chinese readout, present a rosy picture of India-China ties; however, the bilateral equation is marred by mistrust, skepticism, and animosity. One must not forget that this bonhomie is coming close on the heels of Trump imposing 25 % tariffs plus 25 % additional penalty on Indian exports, signalling a major economic challenge for India. Given that India is compelled by strictly pragmatic geopolitical considerations in cosying up to China. India has not yet left the Western camp and made a decisive shift to the anti-West Chinese camp; however, India is hedging its bets as the best possible option against the vagaries of American foreign policy in the Trump era.  Also, Washington’s growing proximity to Islamabad weighs significantly in India’s strategic calculus while crafting its outreach to Beijing. After the Operation Sindoor, the Islamabad-Washington DC axis has not only strengthened but also taken an anti-India turn. More recently, the US President Trump hosted the Pakistan army chief Muneer for lunch and declared the TTP and Baloch groups as terrorist outfits, adding more to India’s concerns.

Estrangement from the US could cost India significantly in a potential future multi-front war with Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh. Possibly, the current outreach to Beijing is driven by Delhi’s fears that China might support Pakistan in the event of a major military conflict. These fears are not without reason. During Operation Sindoor and the short war following that, China provided highly sensitive and critical intelligence to Pakistan, enabling them to shoot down Indian fighter jets, the number of which remains unclear. Secondly, China is Pakistan’s biggest weapons supplier. Currently, 81 percent of Pakistan’s weapons systems are Chinese. Thirdly, China has made a massive investment in CPEC. After the BLA attacks on Chinese engineers, China has even deployed its armed personnel in Balochistan to protect its nationals. Reportedly, Chinese forces have been working in close coordination with the Pakistan Army. Over the last decade, their visits to sensitive air bases in PoK, GB, and terror camps in PoK have figured in several confidential intelligence dossiers.

Pakistan’s all-weather friendship with China is rock-solid, robust, and immune to Indian overtures to Beijing or diplomatic attempts to create rifts between the two. Even after this India visit, Wang Yi has flown to Pakistan to attend the 6th Pakistan-China Strategic Foreign Ministers Dialogue to deepen the All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership. Going a step ahead, Wang Yi also held a trilateral meeting with Taliban leadership and Pakistani authorities on August 21 in Kabul, using China’s leverage with Afghanistan, to ease tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Chinese stakes in this relationship are much higher. Beijing understands India’s inherent strengths, including its robust democracy, strong economy, and technological advancements, and hence perceives India as a long-term competitor and a challenger in its backyard. This rivalry is not merely about the boundary issue or the Dalai Lama; it is much bigger, strategic, and geopolitical. China does not want to see India as a challenger in its backyard, duelling with it in technology, economy, trade, science, and military. Currently, there is a vast power differential between the two countries; however, India can emerge as a strong contender. Besides, China will not want India to flex its muscles in the Indian Ocean Region, as Indian Naval forces can choke Chinese shipping vessels in the Malacca Strait. Additionally, Beijing is unlikely to welcome India's extraction of the vast hydrocarbon wealth of the Bay of Bengal region. In this case, Beijing's best shot will be to keep India boxed in, dealing with its internal security problems.

Furthermore, the positive trajectory in relations seen in the present times is also motivated, as far as China is concerned, by its intention to keep India away from the West’s, essentially, the US orbit. Earlier, the US’s foolhardy policies pushed Russia into the Chinese fold, and today, Trump’s erratic approach is pushing India away, if not entirely into the Chinese fold. However, India’s estrangement with the US aligns with China’s short-term and medium-term interests. Additionally, if China has any plans for Taiwan in the next few years, India’s alliance with the US would be a nightmare scenario; hence, India’s rift with the US and its proximity to Beijing help a great deal in assuaging China’s fears within the larger framework of its revisionist designs in Taiwan. However, with this rapprochement, if Indians expect China to abandon its friend Pakistan or not support Pakistan in the event of a future India-Pakistan war, then it is a delusional thought. China’s best course scenario would be to prevent the next India-Pakistan conflict; however, if the push comes to shove, China will support Pakistan.

In certain geopolitical circles, it is argued that Pakistan’s growing proximity to the US is upsetting China and creating a rift between the two. However, Pakistan’s six-decade-long expertise in balancing China and the US, leveraging both for its vital national interests, and also exploiting them to its benefit, should be enough to silence the murmurs of the Pakistan-China rift.

To conclude, India’s ongoing warming up to China is a welcome development; however, it is more like a tactical manoeuvre to hedge its bets in the backdrop of its growing tensions with the US. In no way is it a strategic shift or departure from its conventional position on China. India and China agree on larger objectives, such as a multipolar world order, an equitable and inclusive world order, countering the dominance of the West in multilateral bodies, the global economy, trade, and security, de-dollarization, and reforming multilateral institutions; however, fundamental disagreements over bilateral issues remain unresolved. China wants a multipolar world, but not a multipolar Asia. Hence, India must move ahead with guarded optimism and continue to explore its options of engagement with the US.

Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint.