India’s Nuclear Diplomacy in a Fractured World

Analysis

By Amal Chandra and Anusreeta Dutta 

The nuclear age, forged in the crucible of war and justified by dreams of peace, continues to cast a long and contradictory shadow over our world. From the gleaming domes of Kundankulam on India’s southern coast to the fortified depths beneath Israel’s Negev desert, the atom, simultaneously a promise and a peril, has shaped the strategic landscape and moral imagination of the modern era.

India, once a marginal player in the nuclear debate, now stands at a pivotal crossroads: advancing atomic power as a cornerstone of sustainable development while navigating regional flashpoints, proliferation risks, and global disarmament stalemates. In this fractured world, where the dividing lines between civil and military applications blur, India’s nuclear diplomacy must walk a tightrope—balancing ambition with accountability, restraint with readiness.

Nuclear Energy: A Green Bet with Strategic Resonance

In 2025, India signalled a bold new chapter in its nuclear journey. The Union Budget’s announcement of a ₹20,000 crore Nuclear Energy Mission is not merely a climate initiative: it is a national security and energy sovereignty strategy. Targeting 100 GW of nuclear power capacity by 2047, the plan marks a tenfold leap from the current 8.88 GW.

A key feature of this mission is the development of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), compact and scalable power units that promise safer deployment and faster rollout, especially in remote and disaster-prone regions. The technology, indigenously led, reflects India’s aspiration to be a leader, not just a participant, in the global clean energy race. This ambition dovetails with the “Viksit Bharat” vision of transforming India into a developed nation by 2047, while fulfilling its net-zero commitment by 2070.

But strategic logic lurks just beneath the surface. Nuclear energy reduces dependence on imported hydrocarbons, lessening vulnerability to global supply shocks and volatile fuel prices. It also frees up coal-heavy resources, allowing India to assert climate leadership without compromising economic growth. In effect, nuclear power is India’s insurance policy in an age of climate uncertainty and geopolitical flux.

Civil Nuclear Expansion: Promise, Pitfalls, and Public Trust

India’s nuclear power fleet—25 reactors currently in operation, eight under construction, and ten at pre-project stages—has grown steadily, though not without friction. The landmark Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Agreement of 2008 was a diplomatic coup. It granted India access to international nuclear commerce without having to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), carving out a rare exception for a country that had tested nuclear weapons but remained committed to civilian oversight and non-proliferation norms.

The agreement ushered in a new era of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, with partnerships deepening with France, Russia, Japan, and Australia. India’s steady alignment with export control regimes: the NSG, MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement, and Australia Group, further enhanced its credibility.

Yet hurdles remain. The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, though enacted to protect public interest, has proven a deterrent for foreign investors due to its supplier liability clauses. The government is now considering amendments to align the law with international norms and attract private sector participation.

Fuel security remains another persistent challenge. India's uranium reserves are modest, and imports are often subject to diplomatic sensitivities. In contrast, its thorium reserves—among the world’s largest—remain underutilised, though R&D into thorium reactors is gathering pace. Public trust, too, is fragile. The Fukushima disaster of 2011 reignited anxieties around nuclear safety, triggering opposition movements in states like Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra.

To meet its 2047 target, India will need not only vast capital investment but also social license. Transparency, safety culture, and community engagement must become pillars of the nuclear establishment. SMRs may offer a technological solution, but political consent must be earned, not engineered.

Strategic Atom: Deterrence, Dilemmas, and the Danger of Drift

India’s military nuclear posture is shaped by a triad of principles: credible minimum deterrence, a No First Use (NFU) policy, and assured retaliation. Since its 1998 tests, India has projected a restrained yet resolute nuclear doctrine, aimed not at coercion but at stability.

However, the regional security environment is far from stable. South Asia remains one of the world’s most volatile nuclear flashpoints. Both India and Pakistan possess around 160 nuclear warheads, and despite confidence-building measures, their strategic relationship is marked by deep mistrust, asymmetric provocations, and an increasingly blurred line between conventional and nuclear thresholds.

The 2025 border crisis—punctuated by airstrikes, drone attacks, and a U.S.-brokered ceasefire—highlighted how rapidly crises can escalate in the absence of sustained dialogue. Pakistan’s deployment of short-range nuclear weapons (like the Nasr missile) and India’s Cold Start doctrine have made escalation control dangerously unpredictable.

India’s modernisation of its arsenal, especially its emphasis on survivable second-strike capabilities via submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), reflects a deepening strategic calculus. Some analysts have speculated about doctrinal shifts away from NFU, particularly in light of China’s expanding nuclear footprint. While no official change has been declared, such debates raise questions about the long-term credibility and coherence of India’s deterrence posture.

The Negev and Beyond: India’s West Asian Nuclear Tightrope

While South Asia demands India’s constant nuclear vigilance, West Asia presents a subtler, equally dangerous puzzle. Israel, an undeclared nuclear power with an estimated 90 warheads, maintains strategic ambiguity. Iran, despite compliance under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for years, has faced relentless pressure and unilateral withdrawals, most notably by the United States.

The region’s volatile mix of ideology, proxy wars, and great-power rivalries makes the risk of proliferation dangerously high. India, uniquely, maintains cordial ties with both Israel and Iran—an unusual position among major powers. This diplomatic dexterity offers New Delhi a rare platform to mediate, defuse tensions, and promote non-proliferation norms.

India has consistently supported the creation of a WMD-free zone in West Asia—a proposal often thwarted by regional rivalries and strategic mistrust. In forums like the IAEA and the Conference on Disarmament, India has called for universal, verifiable disarmament, while also reaffirming its national security imperatives.

Between Idealism and Realpolitik: India’s Nuclear Doctrine of Responsibility

India’s nuclear exceptionalism—outside the NPT but inside the non-proliferation mainstream—reflects a deeper philosophical stance. Unlike the NPT, which institutionalises inequality by recognising only five nuclear weapon states, India’s approach is rooted in equity and universality.

New Delhi has long advocated for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, akin to the Chemical Weapons Convention, that would eliminate nuclear weapons through a time-bound, non-discriminatory framework. Its abstention from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), similarly, stems not from irresponsibility but from principle: the treaty lacks enforceable disarmament commitments for existing nuclear powers.

This principled posture has earned India respect, if not consensus. In a global nuclear order increasingly shaped by club-based norms, India’s insistence on fairness—backed by a track record of restraint, civilian oversight, and legal discipline—stands out.

Its growing presence in the Indo-Pacific nuclear architecture, particularly through civil nuclear deals with Australia and Japan, reinforces both its energy strategy and its diplomatic brand as a responsible nuclear steward.

The Path Ahead: Splitting Atoms, Building Bridges

The nuclear dilemma is ultimately a civilizational one. The atom can illuminate homes or obliterate cities; it can be a force for emancipation or annihilation. The task before India is not simply to grow its capabilities, but to grow wisely, with foresight, empathy, and constitutional clarity.

As global politics lurches toward multipolarity—with rising regional tensions, technological disruption, and environmental urgency—India’s nuclear diplomacy must evolve. It must combine the confidence of a great power with the humility of a peacekeeper.

This means doubling down on civil safety standards, championing non-proliferation without hypocrisy, and using its unique position—bridging East and West, North and South—to reimagine nuclear governance for a world desperately in need of trust.

From Kundankulam’s reactors to the shadows of the Negev, India’s nuclear journey is not merely about power—it is about purpose. The choices India makes today will echo across generations. For in the nuclear age, what is split is not just the atom, but the future itself.

Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint.

About the authors:

Amal Chandra is an author, political analyst and columnist. 

Anusreeta Dutta is a cotutelle doctoral researcher of BITS Pilani (India) - RMIT (Australia), with experience as a political research and ESG analyst.