Israel Achieved a Tactical Victory, but Failed on the Strategic Front

Analysis

By Dr. Abhinav Pandya 

Israel’s showdown with Iran, following the enormous destruction of Iranian proxies like Hamas, Houthis, and Hezbollah, was imminent. For most of us, it was just a matter of time. Regime change in Syria and Iran’s rapid progress on attaining the critical level of 60 percent uranium enrichment made it inevitable. However, little did we imagine that the war that began with Israel’s terrific initial success, rendering it vulnerable to regime change and annihilation of its nuclear program, would end abruptly with punitive tactical American strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities at Fardo, Natanz, and Isfahan, leaving the changing world order in limbo.

Apparently, President Trump is making a desperate push for the Nobel Peace Prize by highlighting his efforts to secure a ceasefire. However, his bold claims of “totally obliterating” Iranian nuclear sites, setting back its nuclear program by decades, remain unproven. The Iranian foreign minister, Araghchi, admitted “excessive and serious” damage to the nuclear sites in Israeli and American bombings; however, Supreme Leader Khamenei, refuting such claims, and declaring Iran’s victory over the US and Israel, said that the strikes failed to “accomplish anything significant.” The Pentagon’s leaked preliminary assessment also runs counter to Trump’s claims and suggests that the strikes only set the Iranian nuclear program back by a few months. The Washington Post’s June 29 report, based on the intercepted communications of three Iranian officials, also suggests that the attacks were less devastating. Further, Tehran Times reported that the “core of Iran’s nuclear program remains operational.” The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief, Grossi, also validates such claims. On June 29, he said that American strikes inflicted massive damage, but not “total damage,”  and it could be resumed again within a few months. Describing Iran as a “sophisticated country” in nuclear technology, Grossi stated that Iran possibly rescued some part of the enriched uranium. Further, Iran’s decision to cancel all the negotiations on the nuclear issues despite Trump’s offer of several incentives and suspend all cooperation with the IAEA, denying IAEA inspectors access to atomic sites, indicates that Iran is likely to build a nuclear weapon as its sole deterrent against future strikes.

The much-debated question of regime change appears to be dead as a dodo. A senior Israeli diplomat told me that about a million people directly benefit from the Mullah regime; hence, they are likely to fight tooth and nail to defend it. Additionally, the shrewd Iranian regime can demonstrate moderation by relaxing Islamic rules to garner public support. Unless Iran bleeds economically, its institutions fail, resulting in internal chaos and inability to support them, regime change looks like a dangerously romantic proposition.

Further, Iran, a country of 1.65 million square km, more than triple the size of Iraq, renders itself immune to any regime change without bloody ground battles, involving the large-scale use of infantry. Indeed, Israel alone is incapable of a long-drawn-out ground troops movement, given its size and resources. Whether the US is even willing to give it a thought? The larger question here is that of the American intervention. President Trump seems unwilling to venture beyond random one-off interventions to a more extended engagement in the Middle East, fearing another “forever war.” The Afghan and Iraq nightmares continue to haunt the US, and its morale seems low.

After the assassination of top-level commanders, octogenarian Khamenei faces a similar threat. To prevent chaos, he is likely to choose a successor. The top contenders include his son, Mojtaba, a hardliner and the grandson of former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah, and Hassan Khomeini, a moderate and reformist face. If a succession crisis arises, the IRGC is likely to emerge as a decisive entity. With its firm grip over the institutions, the IRGC’s stronghold will be akin to a de facto coup. On the military front, with its vulnerability in air defence, Iran is likely to compensate for that with an atomic weapon.  The other pillar of Iranian military strategy will be a long-drawn missile and drone war, considering Israel’s vulnerabilities in fighting a long-drawn war. If the US is unable to maintain support due to its potential involvement in Ukraine or the Taiwan front, then Israel will be on its own. Additionally, the recent war demonstrated that even its air defenses cannot guarantee foolproof security. Lastly, Israel cannot turn a blind eye to emerging threats from the Islamist Turkey, particularly after the Syrian regime change.

Hence, having failed to achieve these two strategic objectives, Israel and the US are almost back to square one, barring some minor tactical and short-term gains.

Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint.

Dr. Abhinav Pandya is Founder and CEO of Usanas Foundation and Staff Writing Fellow at the Middle East Forum (USA). He has authored three books on Terrorism and Radicalization in South Asia.