Why India must stay battle-ready against future attacks from Pakistan

Analysis
By Dr. Abhinav Pandya
After facing an embarrassing rout by the Indian armed forces in Operation Sindoor, Pakistan has focused its efforts on spreading a fabricated and false anti-India global narrative. Supported by its allies like Turkey, China, Azerbaijan and dubious Western media, Pakistan is making desperate efforts to compensate for its losses on the battlefield by spreading lies. However, as the evidence is emerging, Pakistan’s lies are getting exposed. Amidst these smokescreens, it is imperative to make a realistic assessment of India’s gains and losses.
Unlike in the Balakot air raids, Indian armed forces did not leave any room for raising questions about the efficacy of Operation Sindoor. Operation Sindoor’s success resulted in the destruction of the crucial terror infrastructure at nine sites in Pakistan. The lethal missile attacks neutralised 100-plus hardcore terrorists. Ten family members of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Masood Azhar were killed in the Bahalwalpur complex.
Since Jaish is mostly run by Masood’s family, with different members taking care of different wings of the organisation, like a typical ‘family enterprise,’ the loss of ten members can be devastating. Reportedly, Mufti Rauf Azgar, Jaish operational commander and Maulana Masood Azhar’s brother, was killed, but his death has not been confirmed yet.
Mufti Rauf Azhar’s death can be a shattering blow to Jaish, as he supervised the operational matters of JeM, such as training, finances, recruitment, infiltration, and planning and executing fidayeen attacks in India. Masood’s brother-in-law, Yusuf Azhar, in charge of weapons training and the mastermind of several terror plots in Kashmir, also died. He was the de facto chief of JeM, as Masood takes care of strategic and outreach matters. The other high-value targets include Hafiz Mohammad, a Jaishe, and Abu Akasha, a member of LeT’s central committee at Muridke.
Mohammad Hasan Khan, son of the Jaish operational commander, Mufti Asghar Khan Kashmiri, also died. Neutralisation of terrorist commanders and the terror infrastructure is likely to weaken their capacity to run the terror machinery in Kashmir.
Pakistan’s links with terrorist organisations are out in the open. Following the attack on terror camps, there was a barrage of images showing Pakistan army generals and senior police officers attending the funerals of deceased terrorists. In one of the images, the senior army generals are standing behind Hafiz Abdur Rauf, the US-designated global terrorist and LeT commander, offering funeral prayers.
Secondly, India’s conventional superiority is firmly established. The swiftness and precision with which India destroyed terror camps, military installations, and Pakistan’s air bases proved that there is no match for India. Chinese HQ 9 air defence systems proved to be an abject failure. The Indian four-layered air defence systems intercepted Pakistani missiles and drones. Indian indigenous weapons like Akash and BrahMos and Russian S400 effectively thwarted Pakistan’s projectiles. India emerges as an exemplary military power, inflicting a crushing defeat on its nuclear-armed adversary in a short and swift war of four days, without getting caught in a long-ranging low-intensity war trap.
Indian missiles hit the Nur Khan base, close to the Nuclear Command Centre and the entrance gates of Pakistan’s nuclear storage facilities in the Sargodha complex, disabling Pakistani forces from accessing their nukes hidden deep in the underground complex. The open-source intelligence lends credence to such unverified rumours.
However, neither India nor Pakistan has confirmed strikes on nuclear facilities. Air warfare historian Tim Cooper suggests a ‘clear-cut victory’ for India. He argues that India’s attack on Pakistan’s nuclear storage facilities demonstrates its confidence in thwarting Pakistan’s nuclear retaliation, speaking volumes about India’s capabilities.
Nevertheless, Pakistan’s conventional weaknesses and vulnerabilities stand exposed. The lack of strategic depth renders all the cities of Pakistan vulnerable to Indian missiles. Hostile Afghan Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Baluchi rebels can make Pakistan’s situation pathetic in the event of a full-scale war with India.
In the absence of a robust air defence system, Pakistani forces will not survive long against their adversary. Once their air defences crumble, Indian missiles can flatten Pakistan in no time. On the borders, Indian artillery and superior firepower can rout Pakistani forces, following which India’s infantry can march into Pakistani territory. Pakistanis must ask this question to their Turkish and Chinese benefactors: will they send their ground troops to fight Indian forces?
Discussing India’s shortcomings in Operation Sindoor is crucial to prevent casualties and failures in the future. First, India retaliated 14 days after the Pahalgam terrorist attack. This gap resonated with lofty and aggressive claims to seek revenge. Against the backdrop of the 2019 Balakot strike, Pakistan realised early that Indian retaliation was coming, and it got sufficient time to prepare. Reportedly, Pakistan shut down 1,000 madrasas in the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir around May 2 or 3.
There was gung-ho about the abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty decision; however, the measure without a robust kinetic action would have served no purpose because India does not have the required infrastructure to divert the Indus water into the Indian territory.
Finally, after intense and gruelling debates, India decided to go in for a proportionate, calibrated, adequate, and measured response, targeting only the terror infrastructure and deliberately avoiding the military installations and civilians. However, contrary to India’s intelligence assessments, Pakistan responded with a disproportionate retaliation, killing civilians and targeting military infrastructure.
The Pakistan army launched an all-out offensive on the entire Indian western border, short of sending its fighter jets into Indian territory. Indian authorities expected Pakistan to react along the lines of the post-Balakot response, ie, a localised attack along the Line of Control (LoC).
Possibly, attacks on Bahawalpur and Muridke complex unnerved and rattled General Asim Munir, desperate to resuscitate himself in Pakistan’s fractious army by teaching India a tough lesson. Reasonably, failures in strategic forecasting and assessment might have led to some losses in the air combat on May 7; however, after that, the Indian armed forces did a course correction and destroyed their air defences before sending barrages of missiles and drones and inflicting heavy damage.
As regards Pakistan’s unexpected retaliation, it can be argued that Pakistan’s intent was dubious, and the reaction was not spontaneous. Given that India retaliated with Balakot airstrikes after Pulwama, it was clear to Pakistan that any future terror attack would be responded to with heavy use of force.
Having known this, if Pakistan sanctioned the Pahalgam attack, it can be stated that it deliberately planned this war. Its motives can be debated. Either it wanted to unite the public opinion amidst rising discontentment against the army and intensifying Baloch and TTP movements or test India’s red lines. Some other intelligence assessments suggest that the Pahalgam attack was also aimed at disturbing communal harmony in India and damaging PM Narendra Modi’s credibility. Further, Pakistan’s drone and missile attacks were possibly intended to test India’s air defences to plan and execute something bigger later.
The unexpected ceasefire met with severe criticism from various quarters. Many former army generals said that once again India repeated its history of sacrificing victory when it was too close, as happened in 1947, 1965, 1971, and the 1999 Kargil conflict. Eminent strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney suggested that India did not gain much by destroying terror camps because they can be rebuilt as long as the Pakistan army, the entity behind the terror infrastructure, remains functional. Aptly summarising the ceasefire, he said that India snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.
Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint. The article was first published in Firstpost.