Cross-Theatre Operational Learning and the Security of Kashmir

Analysis

By Umer Iqbal 

 Learning from Visible Conflicts

Contemporary conflicts are documented in unusual detail. Armed groups publish footage of their operations, research institutes analyse the results, and commercial technology is increasingly accessible. Groups operating in other theatres can therefore examine how a technologically superior adversary was surprised, evolving countermeasures and the applicability of similar methods to local conditions. Such learning may occur through public observation, personal contacts, training relationships or independent experimentation. Direct organisational contact is only one possible channel.

The 7 October attack shows what observers may learn from a single operation. According to the INSS (Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies), Hamas used small drones carrying improvised explosives against generators at communications towers and observation posts, damaging systems worth far more than the munitions and disrupting border communications. The lesson concerns the cost imbalance and the vulnerability of sensors supporting a defended perimeter. This evidence alone does not establish whether other groups have adopted the same approach. Drone analysts at Dronesec reported that Hamas operators appeared to have disabled the return-to-home function on their DJI Phantom drones, a precaution against certain effects of electronic countermeasures. This function normally directs a drone back to its launch point if its control link is lost. Disabling it may reduce the risk of an unwanted return triggered by interference, although it also removes a safety feature.

Ukraine offers another example of how battlefield practices can become visible to actors elsewhere. Israel’s Alma Research Center assesses that Hezbollah’s adoption of fibre-optic FPV drones in 2026 reflected the influence of their use in the Russia-Ukraine war. Because these drones transmit control signals through a physical fibre-optic cable rather than a conventional radio link, they are resistant to radio jamming. Alma had discussed the possibility of Hezbollah adopting FPV (first-person view) drones in a report published in September 2024. Some experts quoted by RFE/RL have raised the possibility that Russia supplied information to Iran, but the precise channel through which Hezbollah acquired the relevant knowledge remains uncertain. The case illustrates both the potential for cross-theatre learning and the difficulty of establishing how it occurs.

The Sahel (a broad belt of semi-arid territory south of the Sahara Desert) illustrates the multiple sources of adaptation. ACLED records that JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, an al-Qaida-affiliated militant coalition operating in the Sahel) began using makeshift drones in September 2023, before 7 October, and reports an increase from a single drone attack in 2023 to more than 80 in 2025. JNIM’s drone use therefore did not originate in Gaza. Its subsequent expansion may reflect a combination of local experimentation, commercial drone availability and observation of several conflicts. ACLED also notes that drones remain a relatively small part of JNIM’s tactics, suggesting selective adoption rather than a wholesale change in its operational approach.

The use of small drones by armed groups predates the current conflict in Gaza. The Islamic State (ISIS) used quadcopters during the battle for Mosul in Iraq, as reported in coverage of its drone tactics, while analysis of the conflict’s counter-drone lessons has also examined Hamas’s reported interest in drone warfare in Ukraine. These examples provide context for the circulation of tactical knowledge across conflicts, although they do not establish a direct line of influence between the cases. An armed group may adapt a particular technique which suits its own objectives without adopting the wider doctrine of the group or conflict from which it observed it.

Earlier cases show that this process is not new, although the historical record is limited. In January 1971, Hashim and Ashraf Qureshi hijacked the Indian Airlines aircraft Ganga to Lahore. A journalistic account based on a family recollection reports that the organiser, Maqbool Butt, hinted at inspiration from Palestinian hijackings in 1969 and 1970, particularly the Dawson’s Field hijackings. The case suggests how a Kashmiri group may have borrowed a method from a distant conflict through observation, without any recorded training relationship.

Kashmir’s Security Environment

These pathways matter for India because Kashmir and the wider border region already face drone-related security challenges. The June 2021 attack on Jammu Air Force Station, described as the first of its kind in India, involved drones causing two explosions at a military installation. In 2025, the BSF’s (Border Security Force) Western Command recovered 278 rogue drones, according to its reported figures. Its Additional Director General also reported that drones were becoming smaller and cheaper and that frequency-hopping models had appeared, complicating detection.

Middle East Forum reporting states that Hamas representatives, including Naji Zaheer, attended a conference titled “Kashmir Solidarity and Hamas Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” at Rawalakot on 5 February 2025, alongside figures associated with Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Such reported contacts are relevant to assessing the possible circulation of ideas and organisational experience between groups operating in different theatres. MEMRI reports that Jaish leaders thanked Hamas and pledged close coordination.  Separately, the NIA’s chargesheet in the April 2025 Pahalgam case names Lashkar-e-Taiba and The Resistance Front in connection with the attack. NIA also probed suggested similarities with Hamas tactics in its investigation. Israel’s ambassador in New Delhi also described Hamas’s reported presence in Pakistan as a bad omen.

The Hamas-Pakistan connection extends beyond reported organisational contacts to the political narratives and institutional platforms that link different conflict theatres. The Usanas Foundation report describes public meetings and political messaging that place the Palestinian cause and Kashmir within a common framework of resistance. It also records Hamas representatives attending political gatherings, meeting religious leaders and visiting organisations such as the Al-Khair Trust Relief Foundation in Pakistan. For Kashmir, these interactions may facilitate cross-theatre influence beyond military techniques in terms of political messaging and mobilisation.

These developments point to a security environment in which established local vulnerabilities coexist with the possibility of external tactical influence. The BSF has highlighted the challenges posed by smaller and frequency-hopping drones. Fibre-optic-controlled systems present a separate possibility because they do not rely on a conventional radio control link. Their relevance to Kashmir should be assessed through technical testing rather than assumed in advance.

Policy Implications

Intelligence assessment should extend beyond documented organisational links, as tactical learning can occur through distant observation as well. An analytical unit should monitor developments in theatres like Gaza, Lebanon, Ukraine and the Sahel and assess their relevance to Kashmir. The BSF, Intelligence Bureau, Jammu and Kashmir Police and NIA should systematically examine recovered drones, payloads and equipment in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab to identify changes in design, control systems and operational use. New patterns in terror attacks and contacts between foreign militants and Pakistan-based groups should inform intelligence assessments.

Counter-drone and communications systems should be periodically reviewed and tested against emerging capabilities. Special attention is also needed for smaller platforms and frequency hopping systems. Responses to fibre-optic-controlled drones should be based on technical trials. Known vulnerabilities should be addressed immediately, and new threats should be investigated and tested in proportion to their potential impact.

The central lesson is that tactical adaptation cannot be assessed solely through organisational links. Publicly visible operations, commercial technology, local experimentation and personal contacts can all facilitate the circulation of knowledge. Kashmir therefore requires an evidence-led approach that identifies genuine vulnerabilities, monitors credible indicators and tests defensive capabilities

Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint.