Kashmir's New Militant Ecosystem: Trends, Technology, and Terror Networks

Analysis

By Dr. Abhinav Pandya

Eight years ago, the Modi government took the historic decision of terminating Kashmir’s special status by abrogating Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.  The closure of the 370 chapter ushered in a new era in Kashmir’s politics, society, culture, and economy. The militancy-ridden state had seen massive bloodshed, violence, deceptive intelligence games and social unrest in the preceding three decades or more, leaving a lasting imprint on the collective psyche, culture, social life and political trends in the state. With the 370 move, began the undoing of that, i.e., the government of India’s humongous efforts to retrieve what Kashmir lost in the three decades of militancy and lead it towards a stable, peaceful and prosperous future.  

Over the last eight years, Jammu and Kashmir has witnessed a moderate decline in militancy, end of violent stone-pelting and social unrest, massive private economic investments, booming tourism, generous central government monetary packages, employment schemes, national integration drives, crackdown on drug cartels, and public outreach programs. However, the normalcy can be misleading. This author’s closer examination of the ground situation during his recent field visit to Kashmir and the Pir Panjal region in May 2026 reveals disturbing trends about the terrorist ecosystem.

Intelligence Vacuum

First and foremost, the consensus among the security forces emphasises a significant decline in actionable intelligence on terrorists' whereabouts, modus operandi, infiltration routes, and internal organisational dynamics.  This intelligence gap is evident in the near-total absence of information about the local OGW networks of the terrorist groups, sleeper cells, covert networks outside Jammu and Kashmir, and financial trails. Though the erosion of the state’s intelligence capabilities has happened over the years, drastic shifts in the ISI’s modus operandi after the abrogation of Article 370 are mostly to be blamed for this. However, the Indian agencies also have their own share of shortcomings. Over-reliance on TECHINT capabilities and the resulting success between 2016 and 2019 encouraged systemic neglect of HUMINT capabilities.

(Notably, after this author’s research, the NIA has also confirmed the neglect and resultant loss of HUMINT due to over-reliance on TECHINT)

Building HUMINT capabilities is a dynamic, time-consuming, challenging and highly demanding task in terms of human intellectual, emotional and material investments vis-à-vis the TECHINT domain. Further in the HUMINT world, one has to be a step ahead of the adversary because it is a continuous battleground where rival entities make 24/7 attempts to cultivate agents and double agents, orchestrate sabotage, and expose sources. Even a short-term neglect of the field can lead to irreparable damage. Further, the state police, which was the main repository of the intelligence on account of its robust grassroots networks, was led by officers with poor exposure to Kashmir after the removal of Article 370. Many of these officers nurtured idealistic notions about the loyalties of double agents. Their lack of exposure to on-the-ground conflict dynamics and their theoretical approach resulted in rigid opposition to any dealings with double agents and OGWs (Over Ground Workers), who were the backbone of conventional HUMINT tradecraft. They often helped the agencies in making deep human penetration within the organisation. However, under the new set-up, the officers feared action against them if they engaged with old double agents and OGWs. As a result, they nearly severed ties with most of them. However, such measures took a heavy toll on JKP’s intelligence capabilities. In the post-370 period, the extended security and communication lockdown forced Pakistan to alter its strategy and tactics. ISI disposed of the old OGWs who were mostly exposed and had links with the Indian agencies. Replacing them were Pakistan-based ISI handlers who maintained communication with hundreds of youths in Kashmir, assigned them multiple tasks and shared information purely on a need-to-know basis. Unlike the previous OGWs, whose association with terror groups lasted for decades and who were privy to the organisation's inner workings, the new incumbents have highly controlled access, and that too, to planted and superficial information. In the new set-up, the conventional idea of the OGW was less applicable as tasks began to be assigned to multiple people. In many cases, terrorist groups have started using teenage boys and girls as point-to-point couriers to discreetly transport weapons, cash and ammunition; however, they are not privy to even basic information like the contents of the parcel they carry. Secondly, Pakistan started using ‘hybrid militants’, which included normal white-collar working-class individuals who would mingle into the society after executing an act of terror, which further confounded the Indian agencies. Thirdly, in the post-370 phase, the ISI has expanded and strengthened its grip over the Kashmir militancy. It no longer maintains the earlier distinctions among the three terrorist groups, i.e., LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba), JeM (Jaish-e-Mohammad) and HM (Hizbul Mujahiddin). In the new phase, ISI has a stronger control over these groups, and they have less operational and functional autonomy. Most of them work in a coordinated manner in PoK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) under the detailed supervision of ISI; however, in Kashmir they keep the façade of secular and indigenous sounding terrorist organisations like the TRF (The Resistance Front), PAFF (People’s Anti-Fascist Force), Kashmir Tigers, Allah Tigers, etc.; however, they are nothing more than digital portals, aggressively engaging in propaganda war against India using the fabricated narratives of occupation, human rights, and Kashmir’s disturbing conditions under the Hindutva fascism. To create further smokescreens, Pakistan revived some terror groups of 90s such as Al Badr, Muslim Janbaz Force and Allah Tigers. Since the objective is to create confusion and give an indigenous colour to the terrorism, it is likely that these revived groups do not have a robust ground presence. Effectively, even these entities are largely digital fronts used to own up to acts of terror.

Further, the terrorist cadres infiltrating in the post-370 phase maintain minimum contact with their OGWs and never share information about their whereabouts. Mostly, they stay radio silent. However, if required, they communicate via Ultra Sets, which have not yet been cracked, and via commonly available encrypted applications such as WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal.  Reportedly, they are also using gaming applications. Furthermore, in the new militancy hotbeds, i.e. the Pir Panjal region, the militancy is jungle-centric. The new terrorists are highly trained, including a few directly from Pakistan’s elite SSG forces.  The tough, hilly terrain and dense jungles present the biggest challenges for India’s SFs (Security Forces).

Lately, local Kashmiri terror operatives have begun reaching out to the Islamist ecosystem in the Indian hinterland and Bangladesh to recruit young Muslims and create deep-cover urban sleeper cells. In March 2026, Delhi Police arrested LeT terrorist Shabbir Ahmed Lone, whose network targeted illegal Bangladeshi migrant workers employed in garment factories in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. Recruiting illegal Bangladeshi migrant workers provided easy camouflage, as the Kashmiri youths can be easily recognised and face restrictions and scrutiny in movements across the Indian hinterland. Before his arrest, Lone assigned tasks related to surveillance and reconnaissance of vital installations to illegal Bangladeshi migrants in his network to test their operational readiness. This practice resonates with the latest recruitment practices employed by the Pakistan-based ISI handlers in J&K, where they assign such minor reconnaissance tasks and poster pasting jobs to youngsters to test their abilities and loyalties. Earlier, Lone operated out of Bangladesh after his initial training in PoK in the 90s.

Pakistan’s Game Plan

The intelligence deficit has created instability, uncertainty, and unpredictability in the strategic circles and intelligence quarters. In a scenario where concrete, precise inputs from assets within terrorist groups are lacking, only reasonable speculation is possible. Apparently, the terrorist cadres are deliberately making very few contacts with the SFs, just to keep them occupied. Behind this façade, they are infiltrating in large numbers, consolidating themselves, staying radio silent and planning to orchestrate something spectacular at the opportune moment; however, depending on when GHQ Rawalpindi needs such an action to further its strategic interests. These speculations are indeed alarming. What makes them more disturbing is the lack of concrete information about the precise number of FTs. Reportedly, the Indian agencies’ rough estimates suggest the figure of 100 to 150. Recently, a Pakistani terrorist commander from JeM, Saifullah Khalid, before his encounter in Operation Trashi, in a briefing to his colleagues, mentioned that the Indian forces are perturbed by the presence of FTs and their operations. He did not mention the exact number of FTs and maintained ambiguity as a deliberate strategy. Furthermore, they told them that the Mujahiddins must keep their morale high, avoid physical and romantic intimacy with Kashmiri women and work hard to achieve their goal, i.e. Jihad. The most important part of his briefing pertains to his reference to terrorist commanders making a massive grassroots-level outreach and mobilisation to prepare the local youth to volunteer for Jihad and come out on the streets with weapons at the right time. It is quite likely that in the future escalation with Pakistan, the ISI will use these Kashmir-based FTs, local terrorists and sympathisers to come out on the streets, create massive social unrest and obstruct the movement of the SFs.

Interestingly, Pakistan is most likely to orchestrate a terror attack in such a manner that its direct footprint is not revealed. In the last ten years, Pakistan-sponsored terror attacks have led to military escalation between India and Pakistan. New Delhi’s response mechanism has changed. Operation Sindoor, following the Pahalgam attack, was almost like a short and swift war. It is not over yet, and India has officially declared that an act of terror will be considered an act of war. Hence, Pakistan will either use local terrorist groups, local covert cells and networks of LeT, JeM and HM and transnational groups like ISKP (Islamic State Khorasan Province) and AQIS (Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent), to maintain deniability. Further, like in the Delhi blast case, in the future also, the ISI masterminds are likely to use highly radicalised local networks of doctors, engineers and tech-savvy youngsters. In such acts, they can use locally available materials, such as ammonium nitrate and industrial explosives, to make explosives and IEDs. Further, in the view of a highly polarised and radicalised social milieu, Pakistan can likely use its Kashmir terror networks to orchestrate terror attacks in the Indian hinterland.

Pakistan’s role in the West Asian negotiations with Iran has become critical to both the superpowers, i.e. China and the US. Also, in West Asia, Pakistan has powerful friends like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar and Turkey. Islamabad can likely use these existing vulnerabilities of the great powers to take liberties in South Asia and plan a major attack on Indian soil, expecting the global powers to condone this act, even if its footprint gets exposed.

Disclaimer: This paper is the author's individual scholastic contribution and does not necessarily reflect the organization's viewpoint.